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MUST PEACHES BE PRESERVED AT ALL COSTS?
QUESTIONING THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY
OF GEORGIA'S PERISHABLE PRODUCT
DISPARAGEMENT LAW
INTRODUCTION

As cognizant members of society, people demand access to
information regarding the safety of a variety of products,
perishable or not, so that they may make informed choices about
the use, consumption, and purchase of these goods. For this
reason alone, it may be chilling to learn that many state
legislatures, including the Georgia General Assembly, have
introduced legislation aimed at "anyone badmouthing the state's
agricultural products."'
A constant tension exists between open and unfettered debate
on issues of public concern and protection of the rights of
individuals or businesses who may suffer at the hands of
speakers who overstep their bounds. While freedom of speech is
at the core of our democratic society, the courts and state
legislatures are mindful that some speech warrants
governmental interference.2 Speech involving public health and
safety issues is weighed against the protection of the reputation
or integrity of those who may be harmed by that speech. This
Note examines the struggle between the public's desire for and
right to information and the state's interest in protecting areas of
vital economic importance, such as the state's agricultural
integrity, which the Georgia General Assembly has deemed
necessary to address.

1. Nutty Law Bans Slander of Celery, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 29, 1993, at
A16.
2. For emmple, the 1983 Georgia Constitution provides: "Freedom of speech and of
the press guaranteed. No law shall be passed to curtail or restrain the freedom of
speech or of the press. Every person may speak, write, and publish sentiments on all
subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that liberty." GA. CONST. art I, § 1,
%5 (emphasis added). See K Gordon Murray Productions, Inc. v. Floyd, for the
proposition that "[a]ny invasion of the constitutional rights of others . . . would be an
'abuse of that liberty,' and is not constitutionally protected." 125 S.E.2d 207, 212 (Ga.
1962).
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Georgia recently enacted the Action for Disparagement of

Perishable Food Products or Commodities.3 This statute was
presumably introduced to provide a cause of action for injuries
arising from the disparagement of agricultural products4 and in
direct response to the Alar scare5 that prompted the case of
Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes" (Auvil 1).6
In Auvil I, eleven Washington apple growers filed suit against
CBS "60 Minutes," Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS),
National Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC), Fenton
Communications, and Retlaw Enterprises, Inc. based on a
segment broadcast on the CBS television program "60 Minutes"
that criticized the apple industry's use of the chemical Alar.7 The
broadcast created a nationwide scare that caused apple sales to
plummet.8 The ensuing class action raised fundamental First
Amendment issues.'
This Note begins, in Part I, by addressing the common law
development of the tort of trade libel, otherwise known as
product disparagement, and its relationship to the tort of
defamation, as well as its defenses. Most significantly, the First
Amendment standards of protection set out in New York Times
0 as they relate, or should relate, to product
Co. v. Sullivan"
disparagement will be discussed. Part II examines the case that
gave rise to the enactment of disparagement laws, protecting
those individuals in the agricultural chain whose livelihood could

3. O.C.GA. §§ 2-16-1 to -4 (Supp. 1995) (effective July 1, 1993).
4. The statute was introduced on January 13, 1993 as HB 124 by Rep. Henry
Reaves of the 178th District, Chairman of the House Agriculture and Consumer
Affairs Committee.
5. Alar is the trade name for the chemical daminozide, which is sprayed on
apples and other produce, such as peanuts, to increase their shelf life, and allegedly
increases the risk of cancer if consumed. See Bruce E.H. Johnson & Susanna M.
Lowy, Does Life Exist on Mars? Litigating Falsity in a Non-"Of and Concerning"
World, COMM. LAW.: J. OF MEDIA, INFO. & COMM. L., Summer 1994, at 1, 20. The
bill is said to have been proposed based on "concerns expressed among Georgia
farmers." Jim Wooten, New Law Will, as Intended, Shut People Up, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Apr. 30, 1993, at A14. However, pesticide and agricultural chemical
companies are said to be lobbying diligently for this type of protective legislation on a
national level. Id.
6. Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes" (Auvil 1), 800 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1992).
7. Id. at 930.
8. Timothy Egan, Apple Growers' Lawsuit Puts New Focus on Food Scares, MIAMi
HERALD, July 30, 1991, at 10A.
9. Nicholas K_ Geranios, Apple Growers Suing '60 Minutes,' BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 29, 1990, at 74.
10. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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be crippled by the dissemination of disparaging information
about their products. Finally, Parts III and IV address the
tension between free speech and protection of the agricultural
integrity of the State of Georgia by raising possible challenges to
the statute as currently written and comparing it with similar
legislation recently enacted in other states.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE TORT OF PRODUCT DISPARAGEMENT

The elements of the common law tort of product
disparagement, also known as trade libel or disparagement of
quality, include falsity, injury to pecuniary interests, publication,
special damages, malice, and absence of privilege." The tort of
"injurious falsehood" has recently been described as
encompassing both the common law torts of slander of title and
its offshoot, trade libel.' Product disparagement is now
regarded by some commentators as a subset of the broader tort of
injurious falsehood." The Restatement (Second) of Torts, in
recognition of the constitutional protections afforded in
defamation law over the last thirty years, established a liability
principle for the publication of an injurious falsehood that:
One who publishes a false statement harmful to the
interests of another is subject to liability for pecuniary loss
resulting to the other if
(a) he intends for publication of the statement to result
in harm to interests of the other having a pecuniary
value, or either recognizes or should recognize that it is
likely to do so, and

11. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION §§ 11.02[2 to -[3] (1994); see, e.g.,
Copeland v. Carpenter, 45 S.E.2d 197, 198 (Ga. 1947). The burden of proof as to
falsity is on the plaintiff. SMOLLA, supra, § 11.02[2][a][ii]. Special damages must be
pleaded and proven for the plaintiff to prevail. Id. § 11.02[2][d]. While there is no
agreement as to the definition of malice as it relates to this tort, malice is required
in one of three forms: "() intent to cause harm; (2) recklessness; [or] (3) spite or ill
will." Id. § 11.02[2][e] (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 128, at 969-70 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]).
12. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 128, at 962-63. The RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A cmt. a (1989) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] also uses this
term to describe both slander of title and trade libel. Slander of title actions relate to
disparagement of a person's title to property, see RESTATEMENT, supra, § 624, and
will not be addressed in this Note. Trade libel relates to the disparagement of the
quality of property. See id. § 626.
13. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 128; SMOLLA, supra note 11,
§ 11.02[1].
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(b) he knows that the statement is false or acts in
reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. 4
These same liability rules apply to actions for the disparagement
of quality of property or trade libel 5 and for "the publication of
matter disparaging the quality of another's land, chattels or
intangible things, that the publisher should recognize as likely to
result in pecuniary loss to the other through the conduct of a
third person in respect to the other's interests in the property.""
A.

The Relationship Between Disparagementand Defamation

Although the torts of defamation and product disparagement
are closely aligned, a common-law action for defamation differs in
that it does not require the plaintiff to plead or prove either
malice or special damages in order to be successful on a claim.
At least one commentator suggests that there are substantial
similarities between actions for defamation and injurious
falsehood (the umbrella term for slander of title and trade
libel) 8 as the same speech may provide a cause of action for
either one.'9 Dean Prosser, however, argued against an analogy
between the two torts and referred to the association as
"unfortunate" and a hindrance to the development of injurious
falsehood. 0 The distinction between the two lies in the interest
each is designed to protect: defamation specifically redresses

14. RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 623A15. E.g., System Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131,
1140-41 (3d Cir. 1977); Gee v. Pima County, 612 P.2d 1079 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980);
Menefee v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 329 A.2d 216, 220 (Pa. 1974);
RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 626.
16. RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 626.
17. ROBERT

D.

SACK

&

SANDRA

S.

BARON,

LIBEL,

SLANDER,

AND

RELATED

PROBLEMS § 11.1.4.1 (2d ed. 1994). The defamation plaintiff must show that: (1) the
statement was false; (2) no privilege attached to the publication; and (3) there was at
least negligence in the publication of the defamatory statement "of and concerning"
the plaintiff. RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 588.
18. The names of these two torts exhibit their close connection with the tort of
defamation.
19. SMOLLA, supra note 11, § 11.02[4]. Some courts agree that a complaint labelled
as trade libel can "be read as sounding in defamation." Zerpol Corp. v. DMP Corp.,
561 F. Supp. 404, 410 (E.D. Pa. 1983); see also Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel
Publishing Co., 516 A.2d 220, 224 (N.J. 1986).
20. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 128, at 963.
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injury to reputation,2 while disparagement governs injury to
property, including products or services.22
Prior to the introduction of constitutional privileges in 1964,
which vastly changed the law of defamation, differences existed
between the two torts that made it easier to prevail in a
defamation action.23 Greater deference was accorded to plaintiffs
in defamation actions, who suffered injury to reputation, than to
plaintiffs in product disparagement actions, who sought only the
protection of business interests. 2 4 At common law, defamation
was a strict liability tort; there was a presumption that the
defendant's statement was false, which could only be overcome by
proof that the statement was in fact true.25 Additionally, the
plaintiff was not required to prove that the defendant acted with
malice or prove special damages in order to recover.2"
Alternatively, a plaintiff in a disparagement action is required to
establish that the statement was in fact false, was made with
malice, and caused actual pecuniary loss.2
B.

Constitutionalizingthe Law of Defamation

While the Constitution of the United States, through the First
Amendment, has always afforded freedom of speech protections,2 8 it was not until 1925 that the Supreme Court
determined "freedom of speech and of the press-which are
protected by the First Amendment from abridgement by
Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and

21. SACK & BARON, supra note 17, § 2.4.1.

22. Id. § 11.1.1.
23. The extra burdens imposed on a plaintiff in a product disparagement action
include: (1) establishing that the disparaging statement was false, as opposed to
relying on a presumption of falsity, which a defamation plaintiff was entitled to do;
(2) proving that the publisher acted without privilege; (3) proving malice; and
(4) demonstrating that special damages were suffered as a result of the false
statement. Id. § 11.1.4.1; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 651.
24. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 626 cmt. b.
25. Rawn H. Reinhard, Note, The Tort of Disparagementand the Developing First
Amendment, 1987 DUKE L.J. 727, 730 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 581A cmt. b (1976)).
26. Id. at 730-731 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 580 (1938) and RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 569-70 (1976)).
27. SACK & BARON, supra note 17, § 11.1.4.1.

28. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
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'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from impairment by the States." 29 However, "the
Constitution [I] does not confer an absolute right to speak or
publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an
unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every
possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those
who abuse this freedom."" This Note does not discuss all the
existing constitutional standards; it is restricted solely to those
standards relating to product disparagement.
1. Actual Malice Standardof Protection
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court determined in the
1 that in order
seminal case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"
for a public-official plaintiff to prevail in a defamation action, the
public official must show that the statements made refer to his
official conduct and that they were made by the defendant with
actual malice.12 In other words, the statements were made with
knowledge that
they were false or with reckless disregard as to
33
their truth.
This rule was later expanded to include public figures.34
Additionally, it appears that the Court, in a plurality opinion,
extended the constitutional rule to protect defamatory statements
about private figures "involving matters of public or general
concern."3' However, this extension was repudiated three years
later in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,35 when the Court held that

29. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). While some commentators argue
that this excerpt was dicta, guarantees of the First Amendment, including freedom of
speech and of the press, have been held applicable to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 387
(1927), incorporates free speech, and in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931),
the Supreme Court found: "It is no longer open to doubt that the liberty of the
press ...
is within the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action."
30. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666.
31. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
32. Id. at 279-80.
33. Id.
34. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). See infra text
accompanying note 44 for the definition of a public figure.
35. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1971) (plurality opinion).
36. 418 U.S. 323, 337 (1974).
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just because a statement involves an issue of public concern, it is
not automatically entitled to constitutional protection."
Freedom of speech and of the press on issues of public concern
are of the utmost importance, and the constitutional limitations
placed on attempts to repress free expression "[were] fashioned to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people."38 The Court
has reasoned that debate in the public arena "should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"39 and as a result,
"erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and.., it must
be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
'breathing space' that they 'need... to survive.' 40
The Court in Gertz held that private-figure plaintiffs are not
required to prove that a defendant's statements were made with
actual malice, however, proof of some degree of fault is required
in order to prevail. 4 The Court, in addressing a private-figure
plaintiffs claim on a matter of public concern, held that the First
Amendment requires some fault be shown before it will impose
liability and actual malice must be shown before plaintiff is
entitled to recover presumed or punitive damages." The
defendant in Gertz attempted to characterize the plaintiff, who
had briefly held an appointed governmental position, as a public
figure subject to the New York Times standard, but the Court
rejected this notion.' However, two types of public figures were
identified by the Court: (1) the "all purpose" public figure who
has achieved general fame or notoriety in the community, and
(2) the "limited purpose" public figure who has voluntarily thrust
himself into a matter of public concern." Both of these types of
public figures are subject to the heightened standard for
recovery.45

37. Id. at 345-46.
38. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484 (1957)).

39. Id. at 270.
40. Id. at 271-72 (citations omitted) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963)).
41. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346-47 (1974).

42. Id. at 349-50.
43. Id. at 351-52.
44. Id.
45. Id. This heightened standard for recovery is necessitated because these "public

figures" have "assume[d] special prominence in the resolution of public questions." Id.

Published by Reading Room, 1996

7
HeinOnline -- 12 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1229 1995-1996

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 4 [1996], Art. 18

1230

GEORGIA STATE UNiVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:1223

Commentary on matters of public concern lie at the core of the
First Amendment,4 6 and as a result, "federal and state courts
proceeding on constitutional analysis have recognized that
information concerning products intended for human
consumption... or other matters of public health, require the
plaintiff to prove actual malice to sustain a claim for
defamation."4 7
On the other hand, the Court in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc.4" refused to impose constitutional
limits on speech in a defamation suit involving a private-figure
plaintiff and speech of private concern.49 Although speech of this
nature is not wholly unprotected by the First Amendment, the
Constitution's role is slightly diminished when "[t]here is no
threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no
potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas
concerning self-government; and there is no threat of liability
causing a reaction of self-censorship by the press." 0 A plaintiff
need not show actual malice in order to recover punitive damages
for speech of a strictly private nature.5 However, when the
speech is an expression on a matter of public concern, the
plaintiff must establish constitutional malice before an award for
presumed damages may be entered.5"
2. Burden of Proofas to Falsity
In the case of PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,"3 the
Philadelphia Inquirer published five articles alleging that
Maurice Hepps and other Thrifty Store franchisees had mafia

46. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986); Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985).
47. Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 516 A.2d 220, 228 (N.J. 1986)
(emphasis added); see, e.g., Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 272 (3d
Cir. 1980); Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113, 121 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).

48. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
49. Id. at 761.
50. Id. at 760 (quoting Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 568 P.2d
1359, 1363 (Or. 1977)).
51. Id. at 761 ("In light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no
matters of public concern, we hold that the state interest [in preserving private
reputation] adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages-even
absent a showing of 'actual malice.' ").

52. Id.
53. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
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connections and that they used these organized crime connections
to influence governmental processes.54 Based on these articles,
Hepps brought suit for defamation in a Pennsylvania state
court."
At that time, Pennsylvania adhered to the common-law
presumption that an individual's reputation was good, and
therefore, statements defaming" the individual were presumptively false. 5 The trial court concluded that the plaintiff should
bear the burden of proving that the alleged defamatory
statements were in fact false, and held that the Pennsylvania
statute that placed the burden of proving the truth of the
statements on the defendant was violative of the federal
Constitution.5" The Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded the
case for a new trial because "the burden of showing truth on the
defendant did not unconstitutionally inhibit free debate.""
The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that
"where a newspaper publishes speech of public concern, a
private-figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without also
showing that the statements at issue are false." 9 The Court
acknowledged that by requiring the plaintiff to prove falsity,
some falsehood would be protected from liability." However, it
reiterated that "[tihe First Amendment requires that we protect
some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters."6 '
3.

The "Of and Concerning"Requirement

In a defamation action, the plaintiff has the burden of showing
that the allegedly defamatory statements are "of and
concerning"62 him or her.63 A statement is "of and concerning"

54. Id. at 769.
55. Id. at 770; see Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 485 A.2d 374 (Pa.
1984).
56. Hepps, 475 U.S. at 770.
57. Id. at 771.
58. Id. (citing Hepps, 485 A.2d at 382-87).
59. Id. at 768-69.
60. Id. at 778.
61. Id. (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974)).
62. The Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
and Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), constitutionalized the "of and concerning"
requirement in defamation actions involving public officials.
63. See, e.g., Cox Enters., Inc. v. Bakin, 426 S.E.2d 651, 654 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)
(plaintiff was not named in 29 of the 31 newspaper articles; thus, the court found, as
a matter of law, that the articles were not "of and concerning" plaintiff and were not
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the plaintiff when it refers to the plaintiff personally." In
addition to establishing the public official and actual malice
rules, New York Times suggests that the First Amendment
requires that the speech be "of and concerning" the plaintiff. 5
However,
it could possibly have been read to imply that the
requirement derives from the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and ultimately from the state's
definition of the tort of defamation, and hence that it is
merely an element which the state is presumably free to
require or not as it sees fit.6"
In any event, the Court in Rosenblatt v. Baer" made it clear
that the requirement is derived directly from the First
Amendment.6 8 In Rosenblatt, the allegedly libelous newspaper
column commented on the operation of a government-owned
recreational facility.69 The plaintiff, who had previously been a
member of the commission responsible for administering the
facility, sued for libel.70 Although "It]he column on its face
contain[ed] no clearly actionable statement"7 in that "no
reference [was] made to [the plaintiff," 72 the trial judge
instructed the jury that it could award damages in the absence of
evidence 73 that the statements were "of and concerning" the
plaintiff.
actionable), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 193 (1993); Sims v. KIRO, Inc., 580 P.2d 642, 646
(Wash Ct. App. 1978) (comments broadcast by television station did not refer
specifically to plaintiff retailer, but instead referred generally to bicentennial
memorabilia merchandisers; thus, these comments could be submitted to a jury "only
if it could be said that they clearly refer to the plaintiff"), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 945
(1979); RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 564.
64. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 83 (1966).
65. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 288-92.
66. Blatty v. New York Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177, 1182 (Cal. 1986), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 934 (1988).

67. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
68. Blatty, 728 P.2d at 1182; see also Barger v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 564 F. Supp.
1151, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (noting the "constitutional significance" of the "of and
concerning" requirement), aff'd, 732 F.2d 163 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 853

(1984).
69. See Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 77.
70. Id. at 79.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 79-80. "[Tlhe jury could award him damages if it found that the column
cast suspicion indiscriminately on the small number of persons who composed the
former management group, whether or not it found that the imputation of misconduct
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The defamation award was reversed by the Supreme Court
because of the trial court's erroneous instruction.7 4 The Court
held that a defamation plaintiffs claim would be "constitutionally
insufficient" if it did not satisfy the "of and concerning"
requirement even in the absence of governing state law imposing
such a prerequisite: "under New York Times ... [the defamation
plaintiffs would be] required to show specific reference."75
C. Application of First Amendment Protections to Product
DisparagementActions
Some courts and commentators believe that in recent years
plaintiffs have resorted to creative pleading techniques to
transform defamation actions into causes of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, "false light" invasion of privacy,
and "intrusion" invasion of privacy, among other claims, in an
attempt to circumvent the First Amendment protections afforded
certain defamation defendants.76 This practice is scorned by at
least one commentator, who urges that First Amendment
limitations should, as a matter of law, apply to product
disparagement actions as well as to defamation actions, and that
product disparagement defendants should be afforded heightened
protection to encourage the free flow
of commercial information,
77
which is critical in modern society.

was specifically made of and concerning him." Id. (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 82.
75. Id at 82-83. The Court in New York Times determined that the First
Amendment required the plaintiff to show explicitly that the alleged defamatory
statements were "of and concerning" him because to find otherwise would be "to
invite the spectre of prosecutions for libel . . ., which the Constitution does not
tolerate .... ." See id. at 81 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
290-92 (1964)).
76. See, e.g., Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 1408 (C.D. Cal.
1987), affd, 867 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 812 (1989); Blatty v. New
York Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177 (Cal. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934 (1988);
Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 690 P.2d 610, 624 (Cal. 1984) ("The New York
Times decision defined a zone of constitutional protection within which one could
publish concerning a public figure without fear of liability. That constitutional
protection does not depend on the label given the stated cause of action.") (emphasis
added), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1009 (1986); Johnson & Lowy, supra note 5, at 20.
77. See Lisa M. Arent, Note, A Matter of "'Governing' Importance: Providing
Business Defamation and Product Disparagement Defendants Full First Amendment
Protection, 67 IND. L.J. 441, 445 (1992); see also Vincent Branrdgan & Bruce Ensor,
Did Bose Speak Too Softly?: Product Critiques and the First Amendment, 14 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 571, 572 (1986) (urging that "product critiques are entitled to the highest
level of first amendment protection").
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The United States Supreme Court has determined that claims
such as intentional infliction of emotional distress 8 and
invasion of privacy79 are subject to the same First Amendment
limitations as those of defamation claims, when the case involves
a media defendant on issues of public concern. Lower courts have
begun to follow suit. The California Supreme Court in Blatty v.
New York Times Co.8" stated that "[a]lthough the limitations
that define the First Amendment's zone of protection for the
press were established in defamation actions, they are not
peculiar to such actions but apply to all claims whose gravamen
is the alleged injurious falsehood of a statement."8
The Supreme Court has yet to address whether claims of
product disparagement are subject to these constitutional
principles. 2 In its only product disparagement action, the Court
in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.83 was
not called upon to determine whether it was proper to apply the
New York Times actual malice rule because no challenge was
made to the district court's characterization of the producer of
loudspeakers as a public figure." While the Court did not
express its views on the district court's ruling, it applied the
actual malice standard in its analysis of the case.85
Nevertheless, several lower courts have expressed the view that
the First Amendment protections that govern defamation actions

78. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988).
79. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
80. 728 P.2d 1177 (Cal. 1986) (applying First Amendment's "of and concerning"
requirement to a trade libel claim), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934 (1988).
81. Id. at 1182; see, e.g., Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 961 (1991).
82. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 513
(1984), in which the Court refused to express its views as to whether the New York
Times actual malice standard must be fulfilled by a public-figure plaintiff in order to
prevail in a product disparagement suit.
83. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
84. Id. at 489-90, 492.
85. Id. at 513.
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should also apply in product disparagement actions.8 6 However,
courts are not in complete accord on this issue.87
As to the "of and concerning" requirement in product
disparagement actions, lower courts have not ruled consistently.88 Whether a statement that disparages one's goods or
services must fulfill the "of or concerning" requirement raises the
same type of questions as those regarding the defamation of a
group of people.8 9 In determining whether a defamatory
statement is "of and concerning" a group of plaintiffs in an action
for libel or slander, generally, in order to prevail, the group must
consist of no more than twenty-five members." While there is
no set limit as to the number of plaintiffs who may sue on a
group libel theory, plaintiffs in a large group are less likely to
prevail because it may be difficult for the reader to understand
that the communication "refer[s] to any particular member of the
9
group." '

The district court in the State of Washington recently
determined that all the apple growers in a product disparagement action could prevail on a "group libel" theory because the

86. Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 1990); Flotech, Inc. v.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 814 F.2d 775, 777 n.1 (1st Cir. 1987); Quantum
Elecs. Corp. v. Consumers Union, 881 F. Supp. 753, 763 (D.R.I. 1995) (public-figure
plaintiff "required to surmount the lofty barrier of the New York Times standard to
succeed in opposing ... product disparagement claim[]"); Simmons Ford, Inc. v.
Consumers Union, 516 F. Supp. 742, 744 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that proof of
actual malice is essential to claim of product disparagement when a public-figure
plaintiff and media defendant are involved); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of
United States, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1270-71 (D. Mass. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 692 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 466 U.S. 485 (1984); Dairy
Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 465 A.2d 953, 957 n.2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1983), aff'd, 516 A.2d 220 (N.J. 1986). Whether constitutional protections should
apply in product disparagement actions should be decided "not by a mechanistic
application of terms such as 'public figure' and 'public controversy' but rather by an
independent examination of the First Amendment and other competing societal values
involved in the context of business defamation." Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel
Publishing Co., 465 A.2d 953, 959 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983).
87. See, e.g., Golden Bear Distrib. Sys. v. Chase Revel, Inc., 708 F.2d 944 (5th Cir.
1983).
88. See Auvil I, 800 F. Supp. 928, 935-36 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (stating "of and
concerning" requirement "does not mesh neatly with disparagement theory"); cf
Gintert v. Howard Publications, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 829, 837 (N.D. Ind. 1983)
(applying "of and concerning" standard).
89. SACK & BARON, supra note 17, § 11.1.4.3.
90. See id. § 2.8.4 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A, cmt. b (1977)).
91. Golden North Airways, Inc. v. Tanana Publishing Co., 218 F.2d 612, 618 (9th
Cir. 1954).
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products common to all of them-apples-were negatively
affected by the television broadcast on pesticide-treated apples,
whether their apples were chemically treated, or not.9 2
In contrast, the district court in Gintert v. Howard
Publications, Inc.93 held that a group of 165 property owners
could not prevail on a disparagement claim brought based on a
newspaper article reporting an alleged correlation between the
environmental condition of their neighborhood lake and a high
incidence of cancer in the community." According to a leading
commentator, this court "took into account what the Washington
court apparently ignored, that the 'group libel' doctrine does not
arise solely out of the scope and nature of the harm that is likely
to befall members of a large, defamed group."9 5 That harm must
be weighed against the serious interference with the free flow of
information on matters of public interest that would result if
large groups were entitled to bring such actions on behalf of its
members.9 6 In essence, the public would suffer because the
media would be unable and unwilling to continue to provide
information of public concern if they were forced into constant
fear of "vexatious lawsuits."9 7

II. THE AUVIL18 CASES
A body of case law has emerged recently in the area of product
disparagement that suggests that the constitutional limitations
imposed on defamation plaintiffs may also be applied to
disparagement suits.99 The Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Washington recognized that product

92. Auvil I, 800 F. Supp. at 932-36.
93. 565 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ind. 1983).
94. Id. at 837.
95. SACK & BARON, supra note 17, § 11.1.4.3.
96. Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. CBS News, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 893, 899900 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (holding that a group of one million hunters could not
maintain action for defamation unless individual members could persuade the court
that statements were personally applicable), aff'd, 665 F.2d. 110 (6th Cir. 1981).
97. Id. at 900.
98. See Auvil I, 800 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1992); Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes,"
(Auvil IT), 800 F. Supp. 941 (E.D. Wash. 1992); Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," (Auvil
III), 836 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Wash. 1993), aff'd, Auvil IV, 67 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 1995),
petition for cert. filed, 64 USLW 7605 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1996).
99. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485
(1985); Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980); Blatty v. New
York Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177 (Cal. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934 (1988).
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disparagement claims are subject to the First Amendment
restrictions that govern defamation actions.0 0
A.

Background

In 1989, after significant studies by governmental agencies, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced its finding
that UDMH, Alar's metabolite, was a likely human
carcinogen' 0 ' and started taking the chemical off the
market. 2' In response, the National Resources Defense Council
(NRDC), a not-for-profit public interest group, published a study
called Intolerable Risk: Pesticides in Our Children's Food that
expressed concerns about the unacceptably high levels of
carcinogenic chemicals that remained on fruits and vegetables
most commonly consumed by children.' 3 The CBS "60 Minutes"
broadcast at issue in this case, entitled "'A' Is For Apple,"
explored the concerns raised by the NRDC report, specifically
discussing the health risks posed by Alar and other
chemicals.'
Following this broadcast, a group of eleven Washington state
apple growers filed suit for defamation and product
disparagement against CBS "60 Minutes" and others,0 5 alleging
that they were damaged by the broadcast of the investigative
report criticizing the use of Alar in apple production.0 6
B. Group Libel Theory Allowed in Auvil I
The district court denied CBS's motion to dismiss the apple
growers' complaint, concluding that these plaintiffs could indeed
proceed on a group libel theory,0 7 even though it agreed that
100. Auvil I, 800 F. Supp. at 937.
101. Amici Curiae Brief for Appellees at 3, Auvil III, 67 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 1995)
(No. 93-35963) (citing EPA Memorandum from William Pepelko through William
Farland, Director, Carcinogen Assessment Group, to Eileen Claussen, Director,
Characterization and Assessment Division 2 (Jan. 9, 1987)), petition for cert. filed, 64
USLW 7605 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1996).
102. Id.
103. See Auvil 1, 800 F. Supp. at 930.
104. See id. at 937-38, 940.
105. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
106. Auvil I, 800 F. Supp. at 928.
107. Id. at 935-36. The court noted that under both the dilution and identification
theories associated with group libel these plaintiffs could proceed. Id. Under the
theory of dilution, if a class consists of a large number of members, none of them
suffers injury truly personal to them. Id. at 935. However, in a disparagement suit,
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had this been a defamation action, the growers surely could not
fulfill the "of and concerning" requirement. 01 8 The court noted
that the traditional "of and concerning" requirements should not
be invoked outside the defamation area because this would "be
tantamount to counseling potential disparagors that they are
home free if only they succeed in wreaking damage on a
sufficient number of manufacturers."' °9
C. Burden of ProvingFalsity on Plaintiff
The district court in Auvil III° ultimately determined that
the broadcast was entitled to First Amendment protection."' It
determined that "[in a disparagement case, plaintiff carries the
initial burden of proof to show that an objectionable statement is
false and made with actual malice."" The court found that the
plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of proof as to the falsity of
the broadcast's message."' As a result, the court granted CBS's
motion for summary judgment." The court concluded that it
was "not unmindful of the wide ranging affect [sic] this broadcast
had on Washington's apple industry.""5 However, because the
broadcast was about an issue of public concern, it raised
fundamental free speech and free press issues that required
heightened protection." 6
there can be no dilution because there are personal monetary interests at stake. Id.
"It would matter not a whit whether all of the apple orchards in the state were
owned by a single corporation or, as here, by thousands of 'ma and pa' operations.
The injury would be the same. The injury is merely distributed among a larger
universe." Id. at 935-36.
The test for determining whether a class has reasonably been identified for
purposes of prevailing under the group libel doctrine is whether "(1) the class [is]
small enough so that the derogatory communication may be reasonably understood to
apply to each class member; or (2) the circumstances of the publication reasonably
suggest that some particular member was targeted." Id. at 936. The court concluded
that despite the size of the class, "the broadcast clearly targeted every apple in the
United States whether it was treated with Alar or not." Id. "The message 'apples give
kids cancer' sounds an explicit, particularized and unmistakably concrete alarm to the
consuming public to run, not walk, away from that apple stand." Id.
108. Id. at 933.
109. Id. at 936.
110. Auvil III, 836 F. Supp 740 (E.D. Wash. 1993).
111. Id. at 742-43.
112. Id. at 742 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80
(1964)); Auvil I, 800 F. Supp. 928, 937 (E.D. Wash. 1992).
113. Auvil III, 836 F. Supp. at 743.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. The court determined that "[a] news reporting service is not a scientific
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Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's ruling in Auvil H".117 The circuit court found
that the appellant apple growers had "failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact" as to the falsity of the CBS broadcast
concerning the use of Alar." The growers argued that they
could prove the falsity of the overall message of the broadcast
and thus satisfy their burden of proof as to falsity."9 The court
rejected this notion and found support for its decision in the
Restatement, which required that the growers prove the "falsity
of the statement[s]," not the overall message.' ° The uncertainty
that would arise from basing a falsity analysis on the broad
message of a broadcast would "raise[ ] the spectre of a chilling
effect on speech."'
D. Response for ProtectiveLegislation
The Alar scare resulting from the CBS "60 Minutes" broadcast
pushed pesticide and agricultural companies into action.'2 2 An
aggressive campaign to have perishable product disparagement
bills introduced in many states began, and to date, eleven states
have enacted such bills." Additionally, this type of legislation has been introduced in Delaware, Minnesota, and

testing lab and these services should be able to rely on a scientific government report
when they are relaying the report's results," and to hold otherwise "would so chill
debate that the freedom of speech would be at risk." Id.
117. Auvil V, 67 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 USLW 7605
(U.S. Feb. 26, 1996).
118. Id. at 823.
119. Id. at 822.
120. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 651(1)(c)). The court reasoned
that "[blecause a broadcast could be interpreted in numerous, nuanced ways, a great
deal of uncertainty would arise as to the message conveyed by the broadcast. Such
uncertainty would make it difficult for broadcasters to predict whether their work
would subject them to tort liability." Id.
121. Id.
122. The New Threat to Core Speech: Suits Spur Product Disparagement Statutes,
NEWS MEDIA & L., Summer 1994, at 3 [hereinafter New Threat].
123. See AL.A CODE §§ 6-5-620 to -625 (Supp. 1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-113
(Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-31-101, -104 (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 865.065 (West 1994); O.C.G.A. §§ 2-16-1 to -4 (Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE §§ 62001 to -2003 (Supp. 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:4501-4504 (West Supp. 1995);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 605 (1994); OKLA- STAT. ANN. tit. 2, §§ 3010-3012 (West Supp.
1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 20-10A-1 to -4 (1995); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 96.001-.004 (West Supp. 1996).
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Washington' and is currently pending in Illinois, Nebraska,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina.'
III. THE NEW GEORGIA LAW
Taking its lead from the State of Colorado, 126 Georgia enacted
an Action for Disparagement of Perishable Food Products or
Commodities that took effect on July 1, 1993.127 Because the

Georgia legislature determined that
the production of agricultural and aquacultural food products
and commodities constitutes an important and significant
portion of the state economy and that it is imperative to
protect the vitality of the agricultural and aquacultural
economy for the citizens of this state ...
.[, it created] a cause

of action for producers, marketers, or sellers to recover
damages for the disparagement of any perishable product or
commodity.U8

A suit for disparagement may be instituted against anyone
who willfily or maliciously disseminates "false information that
a perishable food product or commodity is not safe for human
consumption." 9 False information is defined as that which is
"not based upon reasonable and reliable scientific inquiry, facts,
or data."13 Both compensatory and punitive damages are
available as remedies.' 3 ' An action for damages for perishable
product disparagement must "be commenced within two years
after the cause of action accrues."3 2
A. Shortcomings in the Language of the Statute
Several constitutional questions arise in connection with the
Georgia statute. First, by presuming that a statement is

124. New Threat, supra note 122, at 4.
125. James Grossberg et al., Food Disparagement Bills Defeated in California
Enacted in Oklahoma and Texas, LIBELLETIER (Libel Defense Resource Ctr., New
York, N.Y.), June 1995, at 13 [hereinafter LIBELLETTER].
126. Nutty Law Bans Slander of Celery, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 29, 1993, at
A16.
127. O.C.G.A. §§ 2-16-1 to -4 (Supp. 1995).
128. Id. § 2-16-1.
129. Id. § 2-16-2(1).
130. Id.

131. Id. § 2-16-3.
132. Id. § 2-16-4.
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actionable if it is false, meaning "not based upon reasonable and
reliable scientific inquiry, facts, or data,"'33 the law appears to
eliminate the "actual malice" standard of protection set out in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan." If information is deemed
false, the plaintiff in a disparagement claim under this statute
may be relieved of proving that the defendant had "knowledge
that [the communication] was false or [was made] with reckless
35
disregard of whether it was false or not.""
Second, the Georgia law appears to place the burden of proof
on the defendant, rather than the plaintiff, who, according to the
United States Supreme Court in PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps,"' is to bear the burden of proof as to falsity in libel
actions against media defendants involving matters of public
concern.'3 7 If the language of Code section 2-16-2(1),
specifically, the phrase "deemed to be false," was intended to
create a presumption of falsity, it thereby places the affirmative
burden of proving that the statements are true on the defendant
and eliminates the constitutional protection.'38 Alternatively,
the courts could interpret the statute's language as meaning that
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's disparagement is
"not based upon reasonable and reliable scientific... data,""9
which probably passes constitutional muster.'4 ° Additionally,
the Georgia statute ignores the "of and concerning" requirement
a cause of action for an infinite number of
by creating
4
plaintiffs.1 1

133. Id. § 2-16-2(1).
134. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
135. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280.
136. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
137. Id. at 777-79.
138. O.C.G.A. § 2-16-2(1) (Supp. 1995).
139. Id.
140. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). It is important to note that even in a common-law
tort action for product disparagement, the burden of proof as to falsity is on the
plaintiff, as is proof of some form of malice on the part of the defendant. See supra
notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
141. O.C.G-.A § 2-16-2(3) (Supp. 1995). The "[piroducers, processors, marketers, and
sellers" who are provided this cause of action include "the entire chain from grower
to consumer." Id.
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B. Arguments Advanced Against the Legislation Before the
Georgia Judiciary
A recent challenge to the Georgia statute was filed in Fulton
County Superior Court on April 7, 1994142 by two consumer

advocacy groups who regularly provide information to citizens
regarding pesticide residues in food, irradiation of food, and other
matters of public interest.'" Essentially, the suit was filed to
defend the right of citizens to be educated about the foods they
consume.' The two advocacy groups, whose missions are to
scrutinize the practices and products of the agricultural industry,
sought to have the statute declared unconstitutional.'45
These plaintiffs filed suit against the State of Georgia because
they were fearful of future suits that might be instituted against
them under Code section 2-16-3.'4 The court, by an order dated
September 27, 1994, granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss. 47 The court found that no legal interest was created in
the State of Georgia through the legislative grant of a private
cause of action under Georgia's Perishable Product
Disparagement Act and, additionally, that no justiciable
controversy was raised by the plaintiffs' action.'"
This finding was upheld by the Georgia Court of Appeals.'40
A petition for writ of certiorari was filed with the Georgia
Supreme Court by the public awareness groups challenging the
statute; however, the court declined review of the appeal. 5 ' The

142. Action for a Clean Environment v. Georgia, Civil Action No. E-27136 (Fulton
County Super. Ct. filed Apr. 7, 1994).
143. The two groups are Action for a Clean Environment and Parents for Pesticide
Alternatives.
144. See Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Action for a
Clean Environment v. Georgia (Fulton County Super. Ct.) (Civil Action No. E-27136)
(filed June 15, 1994).
145. The plaintiffs filed their complaint, petitioning the court to declare that
O.C.GA. § 2-16-1 to -4 violates the Georgia Constitution and the First Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution.
146. See Plaintiffs' Complaint for Unconstitutional Restriction of the Right to Free
Speech at 3, Action for a Clean Environment v. Georgia (Fulton County Super. Ct.
1994) (Civil Action No. E-27136).
147. Order of Dismissal, Action for a Clean Environment v. Georgia (Fulton County
Super. Ct. 1994) (Civil Action No. E-27136).
148. Id.
149. Order, Action for a Clean Environment v. Georgia (Ga. Ct. App. 2d Div.,
May 4, 1995) (No. A95A0602).
150. Petition for writ of cert. fied May 22, 1995.
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statute could still be challenged when someone is actually sued
under it.
C. Potential Challenges to the Statute
Although no such case has ever been before any court, one
commentator indicates, interestingly enough, that the plaintiff's
argument in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.5 ' may help a product
disparagement law challenger to prevail on a theory that the
statute impermissibly targets speech of those critical of the
pesticide and agricultural communities.'52 In R.A.V., a city
ordinance banning certain "fighting words" related specifically to
the subjects of "race, color, creed, religion or gender" was found
unconstitutional because the city "impose[d] special prohibitions
on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects."'53
In essence, the Georgia statute proscribes certain speech
regarding agricultural and aquacultural perishable products, but
no other products, which could potentially be challenged under
the First Amendment principles governing content neutrality set
out in R.A.V.'54
Should a challenge be raised questioning the meaning of the
language "willful or malicious" in Code section 2-16-2(1),"' the
potential challenger may run into the same problem that the
plaintiff did in Straw v. Chase Revel, Inc. 5 ' In Straw, the
publisher of the Business OpportunitiesDigest, J.F. Straw, filed a
defamation action against one of his rival publishers, Chase
Revel, for allegedly defamatory statements made about his
publication in the rival publication, Entrepreneur Magazine."'
The plaintiff sought to have Georgia Code section 51-5-5 declared
unconstitutional because it allowed for the inference of
malice.'58 The court declined to hold that this section was
151. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
152. New Threat, supra note 122, at 5.
153. RA.V., 505 U.S. at 391.
154. Id. at 383-84. Certain categories of speech, for example, defamation, may,
"consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of [its] constitutionally
proscribable content"; however, although "the government may proscribe libel[,] . . .it
may not make the further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of
the government." Id.
155. O.C.G.A. § 2-16-2(1) (Supp. 1995).
156. 813 F.2d 356 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856 (1987).
157. Id. at 358-59.
158. Id. at 362-63. "In all actions for printed or spoken defamation, malice is
inferred from the character of the charge. However, the existence of malice may be
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unconstitutional because it "clearly relate[d] to O.C.G.A. § 51-5-1,
which requires that a statement be 'false and malicious' in order
to constitute libel. This means malice in the common law sense,
not actual malice."'59 The court stated that the constitutional
issue would arise only if a public-figure plaintiff and media
defendant were involved, and in that instance, actual malice
could not be presumed.160 The court concluded that "[iun such
cases, the potential constitutional pitfalls posed by § 51-5-5 may
be avoided by the trial judge, who need only explain what
common law malice means under § 51-5-5, and carefully
distinguish it from actual malice." 6 ' A future court may, in a
case challenging Georgia's perishable product disparagement
law's constitutionality, judicially graft the "actual malice"
standard onto the statute as the court did in Straw.
IV.

COULD THE STATUTE HAVE BEEN DRAFTED DIFFERENTLY

TO AvoD ANY CONSTITUTIONAL PITFALLS?

While some states have chosen not to implement comparable
statutes," 2 others have recently enacted similar legislation.'63
A Louisiana statute, as drafted, offers no solution to the potential
problems from which the Georgia law suffers. The Louisiana
statute appears to eliminate the "actual malice" standard by

rebutted by proof. In all cases, such proof shall be considered in mitigation of
damages. In cases of privileged communications, such proof shall bar a recovery."
O.C.G.A. § 51-5-5 (1982).
159. Straw, 813 F.2d at 363 n.7.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. States that have considered enacting agricultural product disparagement
statutes but have rejected such legislation include Delaware, Iowa, North Dakota,
Washington, and Wyoming. LIBELLETrER, supra note 125, at 13.
163. Texas's proposed statute was defeated by the state Senate, in which the
sentiment of one senator was that "by affording a cause of action 'for slandering an
asparagus,' the bill would 'treat vegetables better than ...
members of the
legislature.' "Amici Curiae Brief for Appellees, at 33 n.32, Auvil IV, 67 F.3d 816 (9th
Cir.) (No. 93-35963) (1994) (quoting a state Senator from Texas and cited in Senate
Rejects Food Product Disparagement Bill, UNITED PRESS INT'L, May 20, 1993). The
Texas legislation, defeated in 1993, was reintroduced in 1995 and was enacted just
three short months after its introduction. LIBELLETTER, supra note 125, at 13. The
bill passed was "a boiled-down version of the original measure." Sherry C. Tuell, Shut
Up and Eat/Texas House Tentatively Approves Bill Making Libel of Fruits, Veggies
Possible, HoUs. CHRON., Mar. 30, 1995, at 1. In response to First Amendment
concerns raised by opponents of the legislation, the bill was amended to place the
burden of falsity on the plaintiff. Id.; see TEX. Cv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 96.003 (West Supp. 1996).
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requiring only that the speaker "knows or should have known" of

the falsity of the statement."6 Based upon this language, the
plaintiff need only show that the defendant was negligent, while
the constitutional standard requires a showing that the
defendant knew the statement was false or acted with reckless
disregard of its falsity. 6 ' In addition, the Louisiana statute
contains a presumption of falsity.'6 6 Another possible
shortcoming in Louisiana's statute is that it creates a cause of
action for disparagement, which is available to "[any producer of
perishable agricultural or aquacultural food products who suffers
damage as a result of another person's disparagement of any
such perishable agricultural or aquacultural food product,"'6 7
thereby disregarding the "of and concerning" requirement.
Alabama's statute presumes falsity if the information "is not
based upon reasonable and reliable scientific inquiry, facts, or
data."'68 The statute additionally seeks to eliminate any
constitutionally required actual malice protection.'69
An Idaho statute, enacted in 1992, appears to be the least
harsh of all the new statutes because it expressly preserves all
First Amendment protections. 7 ' Code section 6-2002(1)(d)

164. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:4502(1) (West Supp. 1995). The full text of § 3:4502(1)
states:
"Disparagement" means dissemination to the public in any manner of any
false information that the disseminator knows or should have known to
be false, and which states or implies that a perishable agricultural or
aquacultural food product is not safe for consumption by the consuming
public. Such information is presumed to be false when not based upon
reasonable and reliable scientific inquiry, facts, or data.
Id. Arizona's statute also permits recovery if defendant "knows or should have
known" that the information disseminated was false, thereby sidestepping the actual
malice standard. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-113(E)(1) (Supp. 1995); see also FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 865.065(2)(a) (West 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 3012 (West Supp.
1996).
165. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964).
166. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:4502(1) (West Supp. 1995).
167. Id. § 3:4503 (emphasis added).
168. ALA. CODE § 6-5-621(1) (Supp. 1995).
169. See id. § 6-5-623, which provides that "[iut is no defense under this article that
the actor did not intend, or was unaware of, the act charged." Id. (emphasis added).
This section proposes that defendants will be held strictly liable.
170. IDAHO CODE §§ 6-2002 to -2003 (Supp. 1995). The full text of § 6-2003, which
creates the cause of action, is as follows:
(1) A producer of perishable agricultural food products who suffers actual
damages as a result of another person's disparagement of the producer's
product may bring an action for actual damages in a court of competent
jurisdiction.
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requires that the defendant's statement be made with actual
malice,'' and Code section 6-2002(1)(a) provides that the "of
and concerning" requirement must be fulfilled.' 2 Further, the
burden of
proving the falsity of the statement rests with the
73
plaintiff.'

Unfortunately, none of these statutes has, as of yet, been
judicially interpreted. However, when the original Idaho
legislation was introduced in 1992, the Attorney General issued
her opinion of the bill, as drafted, and concluded that "it raised
First Amendment 'concerns... of sufficient magnitude that a
reviewing court would likely find' such legislation
'unconstitutional.' "',"7
In response, the legislature
7 modified the

statute so as to avoid any constitutional pitfalls.'

1

CONCLUSION

Georgia's Action for Disparagement of Perishable Food
Products or Commodities was created to protect those in the
agricultural food chain-from producers to consumers-from false
statements that disparage their perishable products. This is an
admirable goal because the state's economy is best served by
(2) The plaintiff shall bear the burden of proof and persuasion as to each
element of the cause of action and must prove each element by clear and
convincing evidence.
(3) The plaintiff may only recover actual pecuniary damages. Neither
presumed nor punitive damages shall be allowed.
(4) The disparaging factual statement must be clearly directed at a
particular plaintiffs product. A factual statement regarding a generic
group of products, as opposed to a specific producer's product, shall not
serve as the basis for a cause of action.
(5) Notwithstanding any limitation contained in chapter 2, title 5, Idaho
Code, an action under the provisions of this chapter must be commenced
within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues and not thereafter.
(6) This statutory cause of action is not intended to abrogate the common
law action for product disparagement or any other cause of action
otherwise available.
Id. § 6-2003.
171. Id. § 6-2002(1)(d). "The defendant made the statement with actual malice, that
is, he knew that the statement was false or acted in reckless disregard of its truth
or falsity." Id.
172. Id. § 6-2002(1)(a). "The published statement is of or concerning the plaintiff's
specific perishable agricultural food product." Id. (emphasis added).
173. Id. § 6-2003(2).
174. Amici Curiae Brief for Appellees at 33, Auvil IV, 67 F.3d 816 (9th Cir.) (No.
93-35963) (1994) (citing Op. Idaho Atty. Gen., at 11 (Feb. 28, 1992) (regarding House
Bill 593-Product Disparagement)).
175. See IDAHO CODE § 6-2001 to -2003 (Supp. 1995).
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protecting its interests in agriculture. Georgia depends on its
peach and peanut farmers, among others, to harvest successfully
to help assure Georgia's future job creation, economic growth,
and active participation in interstate commerce.
However, because this statute attempts to prohibit certain
speech, it will have to overcome constitutional hurdles should it
ever be challenged. Lack of the "actual malice" standard of
protection, coupled with the presumption of falsity problem,
creates First Amendment concerns.
The law, as currently written, appears to preserve peaches at
all costs, but if peaches are the pits, should the public be denied
a right to know?
Julie J. Srochi
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